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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Respondent, 
vs. s 
SHANE DOYLE, j 
Appellant/Petitioner. : 
: Case No. 
\ Court of Appeals No. 
\ Priority No. 12 
950383-CA 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in its determinations 
concerning the constitutional propriety of "all persons present" 
warrants and its appropriate standard of review, when such 
determinations are important questions of federal and state law 
which should be decided by this Court, and when those 
determinations are in direct conflict with the Utah Court of 
Appeals' decision in State v. Covington, 904 P.2d 209 (Utah App. 
1995)? 
2. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in its determination that 
the magistrate, in this case, had a "substantial basis" for 
finding there was probable cause for the issuance of an "all 
persons present" warrant? 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Dovle, 
Case No. 950383, 291 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah App. 5/23/96) was 
filed on May 23, 1996. A copy of that Opinion is contained in 
the Appendix at Tab #1. 
1 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals issued its Opinion in State v. 
Dovle, 291 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah App. 1996), on May 23, 1996. 
On June 24, 1996, this Court granted Doyle a fifteen day 
enlargement of time—up to and including July 9, 1996—within 
which to file a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. Therefore, 
this petition is timely filed pursuant to Rules 22(a), 48(a) and 
(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Furthermore, this 
Court has jurisdiction to review this Petition pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) and § 78-2a-4 (1995). 
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-201 (1995) 
A search warrant is an order issued by a magistrate in the 
name of the state and directed to a peace officer, 
describing with particularity the thing, place, or person to 
be searched and the property or evidence to be seized by him 
and brought before the magistrate. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-203(1) (1995) 
A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing the 
person or place to be searched and the person, property, or 
evidence to be seized (emphasis added). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant/Petitioner, Shane Doyle, entered a conditional "no 
contest" plea to Possession of Methamphetamine in a Drug Free 
Zone, a second degree felony, in Fourth District Court following 
the denial of his motion to suppress (R. 45, 49-58, 67-69). 
Doyle then appealed the trial court's denial of his Motion to 
Suppress Evidence; and the Utah Court of Appeals' panesl assigned 
to this case affirmed the trial court's actions in a decision 
dated May 23, 1996. Judge Greenwood, joined by Judge Bench, 
delivered the panel's decision; and Judge Orme filed a dissenting 
opinion. Doyle now appeals from the Court of Appeals' decision. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In September and October of 1994, the Provo Police 
Department received tips—from an anonymous caller and from a 
confidential informant—that Steven and Angela Hundley were using 
and selling cocaine; and that Steven Hundley was dealing drugs at 
Mountain States Steel, his place of employment (R. 28; 291 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 7, 8). On November 7, 1994, Officer Jerry Harper and 
other Provo Police officers searched the trash can at 255 North 
1600 West, #121 in Provo—the address of Steven and Angela 
Hundley—and allegedly found drug paraphernalia with residue, 
marijuana debris, baggies, and correspondence to Steven and 
Angela Hundley (R. 28; 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8). 
An Affidavit in Support of a Search Warrant (with the 
heading "State of Utah, Plaintiff vs. Steven Hundley, Angela 
3 
Hundley, 255 N. 1600 W., #121 Provo, UT Defendants") containing 
the aforementioned information was submitted by Officer Harper to 
the Honorable John C. Backlund, Fourth Circuit Court (R. 26-29). 
The affidavit requested a no-knock, daytime warrant which 
authorized "the search of the mobile home, together with the 
curtilage and the person of all individuals present within the 
home and curtilage, and all vehicles located at said residence at 
the time of search for presence of controlled substances together 
with associated paraphernalia" (R. 26). 
Under the same heading, a search warrant was issued by Judge 
Backlund on November 8, 1994 (R. 24-25). The search warrant 
authorized a search of the Hundley residence, a mobile-home (R. 
24). In addition, the warrant authorized the "search of any 
outbuildings, curtilage, vehicles, and the person of any 
individuals present at the time of the execution of this warrant" 
(R. 24, 102; 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8). A copy of the Search 
Warrant and its Accompanying Affidavit is included in the 
Appendix at Tab #3. 
At approximately 5:00 p.m. on November 11, 1994, officers of 
the Provo Police department's Narcotics Enforcement Team executed 
the warrant at the Hundley's mobile-home (R. 82-83; 291 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 8). When the officers searched the trailer, the only 
persons present were Steve and Angela Hundley and a child (R. 88; 
291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8). During a search of the trailer, the 
police found incriminating evidence against the Hundleys, 
collected the evidence, packed it up along with the video camera 
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used to record the search, arrested the Hundleys and took the 
child into protective custody (R. 90-91, 114; 291 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 8). 
Based on officers' testimony, a white Escort, driven by Teri 
Olsen with Doyle as a passenger (R. 92-93), arrived at the 
Hundley residence anywhere from 40 to 75 minutes (R. 89, 115) 
after the arrival of the police and after the Hundleys had been 
arrested and both they and the child had been transported from 
the trailer (291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8). Officer Denton Johnston's 
police reported stated: "At the completion of the search warrant 
two other individuals arrived at the home. A Shane Doyle and 
Terri Olsen arrived" (R. 90). 
Olsen parked her car on the public street across from the 
trailer in front of another trailer (R. 89). Doyle exited the 
car and entered the trailer (R. 116; 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8). 
An officer searched Doyle, found paraphernalia on his person, and 
placed him under arrest (R. 116; 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8). The 
officers then searched Olsen's vehicle and found three baggies of 
methamphetamine (R. 101; 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8). At that point 
the officers interrogated Doyle and he admitted that the drugs 
were his (R. 110; 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8). 
Doyle filed a Motion to Suppress in Fourth District Court 
challenging the validity of the "all persons" warrant both on its 
face and as applied to Doyle. Following a suppression hearing, 
and pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Doyle plead no 
contest to possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, a 
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second degree felony (291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8). Doyle then 
appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and 
the Court of Appeals affirmed holding: One, that the issuance of 
an "all persons present" warrant was justified; two, that the 
correct standard of review regarding probable cause is one of 
great defference to the magistrate's decision; and three, that "a 
warrant is still being executed so long as the police 
legitimately remain on the premises to complete a search and 
gather evidence as authorized by that warrant" (291 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 9, 8, 10). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPRIETY AND APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
OF "ALL PERSONS PRESENT" WARRANTS ARE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS 
OF LAW WHICH SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THIS COURT 
PARTICULARLY WHEN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAS 
RENDERED CONFLICTING OPINIONS ON THESE ISSUES 
In addition to protecting people from unreasonable searches 
and seizures, the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution indicate's that no warrant shall issue "but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized" (emphasis added). Utah Code Annotated §§ 77-23-201, 
203 also require that both the warrant and the initial oath or 
affirmation providing the probable cause provide a "particular" 
description of the persons, places or things to be searched and 
the property or evidence to be seized. 
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In this case, the authority-granting paragraph in the search 
warrant executed here gave officers the right to search the 
Hundley's residence and "any outbuildings, curtilage, vehicles, 
and the person of any individuals present at the time of the 
execution of this warrant" (R. 24, 102). While the Hundley's 
residence is described in great detail, neither the warrant nor 
the accompanying affidavit, give a particularized description of 
the "outbuildings, curtilage, vehicles or persons present" that 
are also subject to the search (R. 24-25, 26-29). 
Twice in the past nine months, the Utah Court of Appeals has 
decided an important question of federal constitutional law: 
Whether "general" or "all-persons" warrants—such as the one 
executed in this case—are facially unconstitutional and if not, 
under what circumstances will such warrants be tolerated. The 
United States Supreme Court aluded to this issue, but did not 
decide it, in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92 n. 4, 100 
S.Ct. 338, 342 n. 4 (1978): "[W]e need not consider situations 
where the warrant itself authorizes the search of unnamed persons 
in a place and is supported by probable cause to believe that 
persons who will be in the place at the time of the search will 
be in possession of illegal drugs." 
In State v. Covington. 904 P.2d 209 (Utah App. 1995)1—a 
case decided during the pendancy of Dovle, the Utah Court of 
Appeals, following the lead of other states, concluded that "all 
*A copy of the Opinion in State v. Covington. 904 P.2d 209 
(Utah App. 1995), is included in the Appendix at Tab #2. 
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persons present" or "general" warrants are not facially 
unconstitutional and that they may be upheld if supported by 
probable cause that "all persons in the place at the time of the 
search will be involved in the criminal activity upon which the 
warrant issued." Covington. P.2d at 211-212. 
However, the Covington court also recognized that "as a 
general rule... 'open-ended' or 'general' warrants are 
prohibited." Id. at 211 (quoting Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 
85, 92 n.4, 100 S.Ct. 338, 342 n. 4 (1979)). Accordingly, use of 
a "general" or "all persons present" warrant should be the 
exception rather than the rule. 
In recognition of the exceptional nature of "all persons 
present" warrants in light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement 
of "particularity", the Court of Appeals, in Covington, correctly 
"strictly scrutinized" the facts in the affidavit and accordingly 
afforded the magistrate little—if any—deference in its 
appellate review of the warrant and its accompanying affidavit. 
Covington, 904 P.2d at 212-213. 
Although the general warrant in Covington was ultimately 
affirmed because the court concluded "that the affidavit in this 
case establishes probable cause to search all persons present" 
(Covington, 904 P.2d at 213), Doyle maintains that the analytical 
framework employed by the Court of Appeals in rendering its 
decision in Covington is the appropriate one—and is the 
framework which should have been employed by the Court of Appeals 
in State v. Dovle. 
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Instead, the majority opinion in State v. Dovle, 291 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 7, 8 (Utah App. 5/23/96), accorded "'great deference to 
the magistrate's decision' regarding probable cause." This 
standard of review is in direct contravention to the de novo 
review deemed necessary by the Court of Appeals in Covington; and 
it effectively—and erroneously—eliminates any meaningful 
distinction between the "particularized" warrants required by the 
Fourth Amendment and "general" warrants which have been, and 
should be, used only in exceptional cases. This is an important 
question of law which should be decided by this Court—if only to 
eliminate the confusion which has resulted from conflicting 
decisions in the Court of Appeals. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT 
PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED FOR THE ISSUANCE OF AN 
"ALL PERSONS PRESENT" WARRANT 
In Dovle. the majority opinion held that the issuance of an 
"all persons present" warrant was justified in this case because 
"the magistrate had a 'substantial basis' for finding that there 
was probable cause to issue an 'all persons' warrant for the 
Hundleys' trailer." Dovle, 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9. Doyle 
maintains, however, that regardless of the standard of appellate 
review employed, and regardless of the deference accorded the 
magistrate's decision, the Court of Appeals erred in finding that 
the issuance of the "all persons present" warrant was supported 
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by probable cause to believe that anyone at the Hundley's 
residence would be involved in illegal drug activities. 
In State v. Covington, 904 P.2d 209 (Utah App. 1995)f the 
Court of Appeals upheld the validity of an "all persons present" 
search warrant and affirmed the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress because the underlying affidavit 
established probable cause that anyone present at the apartment 
would probably be a participant in illegal drug activity. 
Doyle asserts that the factual allegations in the affidavit 
in this case, unlike that in Covington, are insufficient to 
establish probable cause for an "all persons present" search 
warrant; and therefore, this Court should grant his Petition for 
a Writ of Certiorari in order to correct the Court of Appeals' 
error. 
The affidavit in Covington indicates that the police 
received information from several individuals that drug 
trafficking was taking place at a basement apartment located at 
479 South 100 East, Pleasant Grove: Rachel Anderson, who was 
arrested for possession of methamphetamine on the day the search 
warrant was issued told officers that she stole the drugs from 
her supplier, Rick Close, who lived in a basement apartment at 
479 South 100 East, Pleasant Grove. Covington, 904 P.2d at 213. 
Three separate sources had provided officers with tips that Close 
had been selling methamphetamine with the past three weeks. Id. 
Finally, NET officers had been receiving tips from numerous 
sources that controlled substances were being sold from the 479 
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South 100 East residence for a year prior to the issuance of the 
warrant• Id, 
In Doyle's case, however, the only information or "tips" 
received by the Provo Police Department were: One, from an 
anonymous caller six weeks before the search warrant issued who 
said that Steven and Angela Hundley were using and selling 
cocaine; that their address was 255 N. 1600 w. #121, Provo, Utah; 
and that Steven Hundley was "dealing heavily" at his place of 
employment, Mountain States Steel (R. 28; 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
8). Two, from a confidential informant who told an officer that 
Steven Hundley was selling cocaine I Id.). 
In addition, the affidavit in Covington detailed numerous 
police observations and activities which supported both the 
accuracy of the "tips" they had received as well as probable 
cause that all persons present at the apartment were likely to be 
involved in drug trafficking. For example, the officers checked 
the criminal histories of both Rachel Anderson and Rick Close and 
discovered that they both had a history of controlled substance 
violations. Covington, 904 P.2d at 213. Officers had also 
recently searched Close's vehicle and found drug paraphernalia. 
Id. at 25. In addition, officers had conducted surveillance of 
the building at various times during the six months previous to 
the warrant's issuance and had arrested people residing in the 
building and had found paraphernalia and controlled substances. 
Id. Finally, officers had observed the purchase of narcotics 
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from the house by Darcy McDonald, who was subsequently arrested 
and charged with a controlled substance violation. Id. 
On the other handf in Doyle's case the officers engaged in 
no such surveillance. There are no facts in the affidavit which 
indicate that officers had observed any illegal activities at the 
Hundley's residence. The only related activity prior to the 
issuance of the warrant which the officers engaged in was to 
seize and search the Hundley's garbage can wherein drug 
paraphernalia, marijuana debris, baggies, and a piece of paper 
with Steven and Angela Hundley's names and address were found (R. 
28; 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8). However, there was no evidence 
found by the officers to support the belief of widespread 
criminal activity which would justify the issuance of an "all 
persons present" warrant. 
Moreover, the majority opinion's that the police's discovery 
of paraphernalia in the Hundley's trash can "strongly supported 
an inference that drugs were being sold from the Hundley's 
trailer" (291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9) is simply erroneous. If such 
baggies and other paraphernalia were used by the Hundley's to 
conduct a sales operation, they would have been found in the 
Hundley's residence and not in the trash can with only trace 
amounts of controlled substances. 
Judge Orme in his dissenting opinion recognized this truth: 
While the search of the trash can, along with the information 
received from the confidential informant and the anonymous caller 
"established probable cause to search the Hundley's residence, it 
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did not establish the probability that other person coming to the 
residence were most likely intending to engage in drug 
transactions," 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10 (dissent). 
Furthermore, all of the cases cited to by the Court of 
Appeals in Covington in which "all persons present" warrants were 
validly issued, can be distinguished from Doyle's case. In each 
of these cases the affidavits in support of the "all persons 
present" warrant contained corroborated information of wide-
spread illegal conduct from knowledgeable sources in addition to 
substantial police observation and surveillance of extensive 
illegal activities. See also, Doyle, 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10 
(dissent). 
In Doyle, there was no surveillance from police and the only 
information came from one anonymous caller and a confidential 
informant, who indicated only that drugs were being sold at Steve 
Hundley's place of employment—not his home. As Judge Orme noted 
in dissent, "Without more evidence of drug dealing from the home, 
there is nothing to establish a link between the home, the 
alleged drug dealing, and any person, other than the Hundleys, 
who may have been present." Doyle, 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10. 
Accordingly, Doyle asks that this Court grant his Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari so that the Court of Appeals' erroneous 
finding of "probable cause" for the issuance of an "all persons" 
warrant can be corrected. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the aforementioned "special and important" reasons, 
Doyle respectfully asks that this Court grant his Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari and review the issues addressed herein, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this "/ day of July, 1996. 
Margarets/Lindsay 
Counsel for Doyle 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
this 7 day of July, 1996, to the following: Kenneth A. 
Bronston, Assistant Attorney General, Jan Graham, Utah Attorney 
General, Heber Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, 
P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114. 
Wfastf* J&WZ h/^r. £^7 
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Tabl 
Cnde«Co 
Provo. VtMh 
State 
291 Utah 
?. Doyle 
Adv. nip 7 
button control the instant case. 
Notwithstanding this supreme court precedent, 
the State warns against manipulative defendants 
who might obtain more favorable sentences by 
disregarding court orders to appear for 
sentencing. The State's concern is misplaced 
given the underlying principles of the rule. Utah 
;ourts respect the "'legislative judgment that the 
lesser penalty is sufficient to meet the 
legitimate ends of the cnminal law. '" Belt, 479 
P.2d at 793 (quoting Oliver, 134 N.E.2d at 
201-02). Moreover, "'(nlothing is to be gamed 
by imposing the more severe penalty after (the 
legislature has acted], the excess in punishment 
:an, by hypothesis, serve no purpose other than 
to satisfy a desire for vengeance. '" Id. (quoting 
Oliver, 134 N.E.2d at 201-02). Dilatory as well 
as dilinent defendants are entitled to the benefit 
of the legt^lafflre^amgndffd piinj<ihments~ina 
Jesaex-aentejnces. 
We are bound by the Utah Supreme Court 's 
determination of the precise issue before us 
now. Accordingly, Yates's conduct subsequent 
to his guilty plea is immaterial to his sentence; 
the trial court should not have considered that 
Yates was substantially responsible for the 
sentencing delay. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court incorrectly sentenced Yates 
pursuant to the statute in effect at the time he 
committed his offense. Under criminal 
classifications in effect when Yates was 
sentenced, theft of property valued less than 
$300 constitutes a class B misdemeanor 
punishable by a prison term not exceeding six 
months. Accordingly, we reverse the trial 
court 's ruling and remand for a new sentence 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412 (Supp. 
1995). 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
James Z . Davis, Associate Presiding Judge 
B E N C H , J u d g e (concurr ing in result): 
_l_agree thal^ under controlling supreme court 
case laWj_Yates should be resentenced to a class 
B misdemeanor. See State v. Saxton, 30 Utah 2d 
456, 459-60, 519 P.2d 1340, 1342 (1974); State 
v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 394-95, 490 P.2d 
334, 336; Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 230. 
232-33, 479 P.2d 791, 792-93 aff\l on reh $, 25 
Utah 2d 380, 381-82, 483 P.2d 425, 426 
(1971). I am concerned, however, about sending 
the wrong message to those who have violated 
the law. 
If Yates had presented himself for sentencing 
when ordered by the court, he properly would 
have been sentenced to a class A misdemeanor. 
Rather than appearing in a timely fashion, 
however, Yates became a fugitive from justice. 
it cook a bench warrant and a subsequent arrest 
fw get him to appear for sentencing. Meanwhile, 
the legislature had amended the relevant statute. 
It seems to me unwise and shortsighted to 
reward Yates for his flight from justice by 
giving him the benefit of the amended statute. 
Nevertheless, we are bound by existing supreme 
court case law. State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d 393, 
399 n.3 (Utah 1994) (stating .vertical stare 
decisis requires lower court to strictly follow 
htghTTcblirt's prior ruling), cert, denied^ 115 S. 
CrT9TTrn995): ~~ 
I therefore concur only in the result. 
Russell W. Bench. Judge 
1. The State claims the actual value of the stolen 
"property is SI234 Coumier's insurance company, 
however, valued the property at Si 150 The insurance 
company paid Coumier S900. the sum owed her after 
her $250 deductible The triaJ court subsequently 
imposed restitution of the $250 deductible. 
The State also introduces an argument grounded in 
comract theory for the first time on appeal. The State 
contends because it bargained for Yates's plea to class 
A theft, resentencing Yates pursuant to the amended 
penalty deprives it of the benefit of its bargain. If we 
were persuaded this interesting theory compelled a 
different result here, we could address it because 
appellate courts may affirm on any proper ground. See 
Hebry v Noble. W9""Md 42&T444 (Utah 1995). 
However, we are unpersuaded and unable to rule 
definitively on the argument inasmuch as the State has 
not cited any helpful authority. Accordingly, we do 
not consider the State's contract argument. 
Cite M 
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STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v, 
Shane DOYLE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 950383-CA 
FILED: May 23, 1996 
Fourth District, Utah County 
The Honorable Boyd L. Park 
ATTORNEYS: 
Margaret P. Lindsay and Michael Jewell, 
Provo, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and Kenneth A. Bronston, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Greenwood. 
Hi ts opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Repor ter . 
G R E E N W O O D , Judge : 
Shane Doyle appeals the trial court \s refusal to 
suppress evidence obtained during the execution 
of an /*all persons present") search warrant. 
8 291 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 PPOVO, Vnk 
contending that the warrant wa* unconstitutional 
both as issued and as executed. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
On November 8, 1994, the Provo City Police 
obtained a warrant authorizing them to search 
the mobile home trailer of Steven and Angela 
Hundley, located at 255 North 1600 West, 
number 121, in Provo, Utah. This warrant also 
authorized the search of "any outbuildings, 
curtilage, vehicles and the person of any 
individuals present at the time of the execution 
of this warrant.'* (emphasis added). The affidavit 
in support of the warrant stated the search was 
appropriate based upon the following 
information: 
(1) a tip from an anonymous caller stating 
that both Steven and Angela Hundley were 
using and selling cocaine and that Steven 
Hundley was "dealing heavily" from his 
place of employment; 
(2) corroboration by a reliable police 
informant that Steven Hundley was dealing 
cocaine, and 
(3) independent corroboration by the 
Provo Police through a search of the 
Hundleys' trash receptacle which yielded 
both drug paraphernalia coated with trace 
amounts of drug residue and items such as 
baggies and marijuana debris which 
potentially indicated the existence of a retail 
drug sales operation. 
On November 11, 1994, at approximately 
5:00 p.m., officers of the Provo Police 
Department's Narcotics Enforcement Team 
executed the warrant. When the officers arrived 
at the trailer, the only persons present were 
Steven and Angela Hundley and a child. Upon 
searching the trailer, the police found evidence 
incriminating both the Hundleys and placed them 
under arrest. The child was taken into protective 
custody. 
Forty to seventy-five minutes after the police 
had arrived and after the Hundleys had been 
arrested and both they and the child has been 
transported from the scene, a white Ford Escort, 
driven by Ten Olsen with Doyle as passenger, 
drove up and parked near the Hundleys' trailer. 
Doyle exited the car and entered the trailer. The 
officers searched Doyle, found drug 
paraphernalia on his person, and placed him 
under arrest. The officers then proceeded to 
search Olsen's car and found three baggies 
containing methamphetamines which, upon 
interrogation. Doyle admitted belonged to him. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Doyle pleaded 
no contest to a charge of possession of 
methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, a second 
degree felony, conditional upon his right to 
appeal the trial court's denial of,hjs motion to 
suppress. See generally State £ Sery, 758 P.2d 
<US. *)H40(Utah App. l<?88). ~ 
ISSl'ES ON APPEAL 
(\) WHS there probable cause to issue a 
warrant authorizing che search o( "all persons 
UTAH ADVAN 
present" at the Hundleys' tnuler? 
(2) Did the search of Doyle exceed the scope 
of the warrant? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
_We "accord great deference to the magistrate's 
I decision" regardim* probable cause. Salt Lake 
f Oiy'v. Trujillo, 854 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah App. 
1993). yifijwjlLinvmlidate^ scarehj)ursuantjp_a^ 
warrant "only if the magistrate, given the totality 
of the circumstances, lacked a 'substantial basis' 
for determining that probable cause existed." Id. 
* (quotingState v. Thurman% 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 
(Utah 1993)). 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality of the "All Persons 
Present" Warrant 
Doyle urges us to conclude that warrants 
I authorizing the search of "all persons present" at 
a particular location are facially unconstitutional 
because they violate the particularity requirement 
of both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. See U.S. Const, amend. [V; Utah 
Const, art. I, §14J However, during the 
pendency of this appeal, this court issued State 
v. Covington, 904 P.2d 209 (Utah App. 1995). 
In Covington, this court determined that a 
warrant" authorizing the search of "all persons 
present" does not violate the Fourth Amendment 
if it is based upon "probable cause to believe 
that any person found [at the location in 
question] would be involved in narcotics 
trafficking." Id. at 212. Thus, it is no longer.AH 
open question whether "ail persons" warrants 
are categorically valid; the only remaining 
questions are whether this particular warrant was 
supported by sufficient probable cause and 
whether it was valid as executed. 
Probable Cause 
In Covington, this court referred to what has 
come to be known as the "nexus" requirement 
for the issuance of an "all persons present" 
search warrant. State v. Covington, 904 P.2d 
209, 211 (Utah App. 1995). The nexus test 
derives from the opinion of Chief Justice 
Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
State v. De Simone, 288 A.2d 849 (N.J. 1972). 
In De Simone, the court found that j^anants-
authorizing the search_ofJlalLpex9ons present" 
pass constitutional musterjf they are supported 
[ oy"proba6J£cause to believe jhat anyone present 
"at the location will likefy be involved in the_ 
suspected criminal activity. The court reasoned 
as follows: 
|W]uh regard to the Fourth Amendment 
demand for specificity as to the subject to be 
searched, there is none of the vice of a 
general warrant if the individual is thus 
.identified by phxsicaL nexus to the ongoing^ 
criminal event iLself. In such a setting, the 
officer executing the warrant has neither the 
Authority nor tho opportunity to search 
everywhere for anyone violating a law. So 
long as there is good reason to suspect or _ 
CE REPORTS 
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believe that anyone present at the anticipated 
scene will probably be a participant, 
presence becomes the descriptive fact 
satisfying the aim of the Fourth Amendment. 
The evil of the general warrant is thereby 
negated. To insist nonetheless that the 
individual be otherwise described when 
circumstances will not permit it, would 
simply deny government a needed power to 
deal with crime, without advancing the 
interest the Amendment was meant to serve. 
id. at 850-51 (emphasis added). The nexus 
requirement has been employed by courts with 
varying results. E.g., People v. Johnson, 805 
P.2d 1156, 1159-60 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 348 N.E.2d 101, 
105-06 (Mass.), cert, denied sub nom., Smith v. 
Massachusetts, 429 U.S. 944, 97 S. Ct. 364 
(1976); State v. Anderson, 415 N.W.2d 57, 
60-61 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Hinkel, 
353 N.W.2d 617, 620-21 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984), rev d on other grounds, 365 N.W.2d 774 
(Minn. 1985); State v. Sims, 382 A.2d 638, 
643-44 (N.J. 1978); State ex reL L.Q., 566 
A.2d 223, 226 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1989), 
cert, denied, 584 A.2d 199 (N.J. 1990); 
Covington, 904 P.2d at 211-13; Morton v. 
Commonwealth, 434 S.E.2d 890, 892-93 (Va. 
Ct. App. 1993); State v. Carter, 901 P.2d 335, 
339 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); see also 2 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search & Seizure §4.5(e), 546 (3d 
ed. 1996) ("Unquestionably, the De Simone 
rationale is correct."). 
_The Covington opinion also refers to three 
jrelevant factorsTdelififfea by thTMassachusetfs 
Supre.me.Court in S/w//rr348 f^E7ZcTat~i07, as 
apj)rjopriAte_ia__determining whether probabje 
cause exists for an * all pc TJOJQS". warrant., 
Cdvfngion^M P.2d~aT2T2. the Smith court 
stated: 
JS[evera! facts are of particular relevance: 
the premises or area to be searched are 
small, confined and private; the nature of 
the criminal activity is such that the 
participants (in general) constantly shift or 
change so that it is, practically, impossible 
for the police to predict that any specific 
person or persons will be on the premises at 
any given time; and the items specifically 
described in the warrant as the target of the 
search are of a size or kind which renders 
^them easily and likely to be concealed on 
the person. 
Smith, 348 N.E.2d at 107 (footnote omitted). 
Each of these factors is present in this case. 
The Hundleys' trailer is a "small, confined and 
private" dwelling. This factor is important 
because an "all persons" search of such a 
dwelling is far less likely to entrap the innocent 
than one of a public or semi-public 
establishment Sec. e.g., Yharru v. Illinois, 444 
U.S. 85, 97, 100 S. Ct. 3J8, US (1979) j 
(holding warrant to search bar did not allow 
search of patron). With respect to the second 
and third factors, the nature of drug dealing is 
unknown persons, while the subject of the 
learch, drugs, are usually easily hidden or 
disposed. Accordingly, _ a_sjnklL_priYlUe 
I residence^ such as the Hundley trailer, may be 
a'permissjble locale for an^all persons" search 
warrant, when drug dealing is alleged, if the 
requisite, degree of probable cause..can be. 
shown; 
Having determined that the situation in 
question potentially warranted the issuance of an 
"all persons" warrant, we must now examine the 
affidavit submitted in support of the "all 
persons" warrant to determine if it provided the 
requisite degree of probable cause. We believe 
the affidavit in this case supports a reasonable 
inference that the Hundleys were conducting a 
retail drug sales operation from their residence 
such as would justify the issuance of a warrant 
to search all persons who might be present 
therein. The affidavit was based upon three 
primary factors: First, an anonymous tip that the 
Hundleys were using and selling drugs and that 
Steven Hundley was "dealing heavily" from his 
workplace; second, a reliable police informant's 
confirmation that Steven Hundley was selling 
drugs; and third, the results of the police search 
of the Hundleys' trash receptacle. 
While the anonymous tip, in and of itself, may 
not provide a sufficient basis for the issuance of 
the warrant, the police took substantial steps to 
corroborate it through a second confidential 
informant and through their own independent 
investigation. The confidential informant's 
corroboration was deemed to be reliable because 
this m form ant had provided the police with 
reliable information in the past. More 
importantly, the police search of the Hundleys* 
trash uncovered evidence which strongly 
supported an inference that drugs were being 
sold from the Hundleys* trailer. In the 
Hundleys' trash, the police found drug 
parapherna l ia , trace amounts of 
methamphetamines, marijuana debris, butane 
fuel canisters, syringes and baggies. 
This evidence was interpreted for the 
magistrate by the affiant, Officer Jerry Harper. 
Officer Harper expressed his belief, based upon 
his substantial experience in drug enforcement, 
that this evidence established the likelihood that 
controlled substances would be found in the 
Hundley residence. He also stated his belief that 
a no-knock "all persons" warrant was necessary 
due to the fact that, by their very nature, drugs 
are easily susceptible to being hidden or 
destroyed. 
Having reviewed the information in the 
affidavit, we conclude that the magistrate had a 
"substantial basis" for finding that there was 
probable cause to issUv? an "all persons" warrant 
for the Hundleys' trailer. The information 
contained in the affidavit supports a reasonable 
inference of an on-going criminal enterprise 
operated out of the Hundleys* trailer. Such an 
mference provides the requisjte ne_xus_Jo 
cninmaiactivity to justifyjhejsjuiaiice of anlall 
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Execution of the Warrant 
Doyle next asserts that even if we find that the 
warrant was based upon probable cause, it did 
not permit a search of his person because the 
warrant had been executed before he arrived. 
Doyle argues that even if the warrant did permit 
a search of persons present or arriving shortly 
after the police began their search, it did not 
permit a search of Doyle because when he 
arrived, the police had completed their search 
and thus were no longer executing the warrant. 
We begin by examining the language of the 
warrant. The warrant authorized the search of 
"any individuals present at the time of the 
execution of the warrant." This language is 
susceptible to two different interpretations. The 
time of execution could be limited to the exact 
time the police serve the warrant, or it could be 
the entire time the police are legitimately on the 
premises under the authority of the warrant. We 
believe the latter is a more reasonable 
interpretation. 
The clear intent behind a warrant to search 
"all persons present" is to allow a search of any 
persons, who by their mere presence, are 
potentially implicated in the criminal activity in 
question. The nexus between a person's 
presence and his or her relation to criminal 
activity does not change simpty because of the 
passage of a short period of time. Therefocc^an 
"alljpecsons present" warrant applies equally to 
all persons who^are present within a reasonable 
time_ after_ the executioa_of the .warrant, 
including those who _ arrive _on thc_ premises 
while the police are still legitimately present. 
Furthermore, we believe the nexus requirement 
already provides sufficient protection against 
police overreaching. See Commonwealth v. 
Graciani, 554 A.2d 560, 562-63 (Pa. 1989). 
Accordingly, we hold that the warrant 
authorized the search of Doyle despite the fact 
that he arrived on the scene during the execution 
of the search warrant. See id. at 562 ("'We 
cannot sanction any rule that through fraud and 
gamesmanship erects barriers to the effective 
and legitimate execution of search warrants.") 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Reece, 549 A.2d 
909, 911 (Pa. 1988)). 
The last argument we address is whether the 
police had completed their execution of the 
warrant when Doyle arrived. Although the 
Hundleys and the child had already been 
transported, that does not necessarily mean the 
officers were no longer entitled to remain on the 
premises for a reasonable period in order to 
complete their investigation. Apparently, the 
officers were completing the gathering of 
evidence when Doyle arrived at the Hundley 
trailer. Doyle has not asserted that they were no 
longer authonzed to be on the premises nor that 
they were intentionally loitering in hopes of 
snaring other suspects. Accordingly, we concur 
m the trial court's analysis of this issua-and hold 
that a warrant is still being executed so long as 
the police legitimately remain on the premises to 
complete a search and gathering of evidence as 
authonzed by that warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
Covington establishes that warrants to search 
"all persons present1* at a given location are 
permissible if supported by probable cause to 
believe that anyone present is likely to be 
involved in the cnminal activity m question. 
Because the affidavit at issue in this case 
provided the magistrate with sufficient evidence 
to infer the requisite degree of probable cause, 
the warrant was valid and authonzed a search of 
any person who was present at the Hundleys' 
trailer. Furthermore, despite the fact that Doyle 
arrived after the police had begun their search, 
he was still a "person present" for purposes of 
the wan-ant's language. Finally, because the 
police were still in the process of executing the 
warrant when Doyle arrived, they were justified 
in searching his person. For the foregoing 
reasons, we affirm the trial court's refusal to 
suppress the evidence. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
ORME, Presiding Judge (dissenting): 
I dissent. While the affidavit established 
probabte cause to search the Hundleys* 
residence, it did not establish the probability that 
other persons coming to the residence were most 
likely intending to engage in drug transactions. 
Quite the contrary, the affidavit identified Steve 
Hundley's place of employment, rather than the 
residence, as the hotbed of sale activity. While 
I take no issue with the general law outlined by 
the majority, I fail to see how the affidavit 
established, in the words of the main opinion, 
"probable cause to believe that anyone present at 
the location will likely be involved in the 
suspected criminal activity." While I concede the 
three factors delineated in Commonwealth v. 
Smith, 348 N.E.2d 101, 107 (Mass. 1976), seem 
to be present in this case, as duly noted by the 
majority, this is merely a threshold question and 
not dispositive of whether the "all persons 
present" warrant was adequately supported by 
probable cause. 
In reviewing the grant of an "all persons 
present" warrant, this court must carefully 
scrutinize the underlying affidavit. State v. 
Covington, 904 P.2d 209, 212 (Utah App. 
1995). In Covington, this court cited to cases in 
which "all persons present" searches were 
upheld. Id. In each of these cases, the facts had 
to establish a sufficient nexus between the 
criminal activity, the place of the activity, and 
the persons at the place. Id. The facts that 
helped establish this nexus are, for example, an 
informant observing large quantities of cocaine 
in the house, drugs being sold from the house, 
numerous persons entering the premises and 
staying for short periods of time, a lookout 
present to wani occupants of police activity, 
undercover purchases of crack cocaine from the 
residence, and extensive walk-in and drive-in 
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traffic at the location. Id. We have no such 
information here. Given the affidavit before us, 
it ts just as likely that the only visitors to the 
Hundley residence were friends, relatives, pizza 
deli very men, opinion surveyors, bill collectors. 
Jehovahfs Witnesses, and persons looking for 
lost pets as it is that most visitors were looking 
to buy drugs. A fair reading of the affidavit is 
that those looking to buy drugs from the 
Hundleys called on Steven at work rather than 
dropping by the residence. 
In this case, there is nothing in the affidavit 
quoted by the majority to establish the requisite 
factual nexus. The only premises from which 
drug sales took place, according to the explicit 
language of the affidavit, was Steven Hundley's 
place of employment. There was no indication 
that numerous persons dropped by for short 
periods of time or even that an undercover drug 
purchase was made from the home. Without 
more evidence of drug dealing from the home, 
there is nothing to establish a link between the 
home, the alleged drug dealing, and any person, 
other than the Hundleys, who may have been 
present. Therefore, insofar as directed at anyone 
else who might turn up at the residence, the 
warrant was not supported by probable cause, 
and the search of defendant was unlawful. 
I would reverse the conviction and remand for 
a new trial. 
Gregory K. Orme, Presiding Judge 
1. Doyle urges us to adopt a reading of our state 
—constitution which is more expansive than the analysis 
employed under the federal constitution. The "proper 
forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing 
anaJysis of state constitutional interpretation is before 
the trial court, not, as typically happens . . . for the 
first time on appeal." State v. Bobo% 803 P.2d 1268, 
1273 (Utah App. 1990). Because the trial court was 
pot afforded a meaningful opportunity "to address Che 
state constitutional issue."W^Tdgcline to ^onduct a 
separate statexonstmitional ana]y_sjs_aaappeal. 
Ctte M 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Daniel F. HARMON, Michael G. Bick, and 
Mary A. Folkman, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
OGDEN CITY 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
CIVIL SERVICE 
No. 950152 
FILED: May 24, 1996 
Original Proceeding in the Court of Appeals 
ATTORNEYS: 
Erik Stnndberg, Ralph E. Chamness, Salt 
Lake City, for petitioners 
Stanley J. Preston, Richard A. Van Wagoner, 
Salt Lake City, and Frederick Froerer, HI, 
Ogden, for respondent 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Daniel F. Harmon, Michael G. Bick, and 
Mary A. Folkman petitioned for review of a 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in 
Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Service 
Commission, 890 P.2d 4 (Ct. App.), cert, 
granted, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995), holding 
that the Ogden City Civil Service Commission 
(Commission) did not have jurisdiction to hear 
appeals regarding pay scale step classifications 
and annual review timetables. Upon reviewing 
the court of appeals* opinion, the briefs to this 
court, and the presentations made at oral 
argument, we find ourselves in substantial 
agreement with the court of appeals* opinion and 
affirm on the grounds stated therein. 
Petitioners Harmon and Bick are members of 
the Ogden City Fire Department. Both were 
promoted to the position of fire captain-Harmon 
in March of 1991 and Bick in May of 1992-and 
placed at step four on the city pay scale. 
Sometime between the two promotions, a third 
employee was also promoted to the position of 
fire captain, but because of his paramedic 
training, he was placed at step seven of the pay 
scale. Harmon and Bick filed grievances 
(Harmon filed one and Bick filed two) 
contending that paramedic training should not 
warrant higher compensation.1 Their department 
head denied their requests for relief, and they 
appealed to the Commission. Following a 
hearing, the Commission entered an order 
dismissing the appeals, ruling that it did not 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Stacey A. COVINGTON, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 940716-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sept. 28, 1995. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fourth District 
Court, Utah County, Lynn W. Davis, J., of drug-
related offenses. Defendant appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Billings, J., held, as matter of first 
impression, that affidavit established probable cause 
to search all persons present at basement apartment 
used for drug trafficking. 
Affirmed. 
/ . SEARCHES AND SEIZURES kl24 
349 — 
349II Warrants 
349k 123 Form and Contents of Warrant; 
Signature 
349k 124 Particularity or generality and 
overbreadth in general. 
Utah App. 1995. 
Generally, "open-ended" or "general" warrants 
are constitutionally prohibited. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
2. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES kl26 
349 
349II Warrants 
349kl23 Form and Contents of Warrant; 
Signature 
349kl26 Places, objects, or persons to be 
searched. 
Utah App. 1995. 
Warrant to search designated premises does not 
authorize search of every individual who happens to 
be on the premises. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
J. DRUGS AND NARCOTICS kl88(6) 
138 
138II Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 
13811(D) Searches and Seizures 
138k 186 Search Under Warrant 
138kl88 Affidavits, Complaints, and 
Evidence for Issuance of Warrants 
138k 188(4) Informants 
138k 188(6) Reliability; corroboration. 
Utah App. 1995. 
Affidavit established probable cause to search all 
persons present at basement apartment linked with 
drug trafficking; affidavit linked the apartment with 
drug trafficking through testimony of reliable 
informant and police observation, residence was 
occupied by several adults with criminal narcotics 
histories, all persons on premises would likely have 
relevant evidence on their persons, and small bindles 
of drugs could readily be hidden on person or 
destroyed once intent to search was revealed. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
Shelden R. Carter, Carter, Phillips & Wilkinson, 
Provo, for Appellant. 
Todd A. Utzinger, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Jan 
Graham, State Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee. 
Before ORME, BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant Stacey A. Covington appeals from the 
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress 
evidence used to convict him of drug-related 
offenses. Having determined that "[t]he facts and 
legal arguments are adequately presented in the 
briefs and record and the decisional process would 
not be significantly aided by oral argument," Utah 
R.App.P. 29(a)(3), we affirm. 
•210 
FACTS 
On February 22, 1994, Rachel Anderson was 
arrested by officers of the Pleasant Grove Police 
Department. At the time of her arrest, officers 
discovered methamphetamine concealed in her 
clothing. Anderson later told one of the officers that 
she had stolen the drug from Rick Close, who had 
additional quantities of methamphetamine in bindles 
at his apartment, ready for sale. She said that Close 
had been supplying her with methamphetamine and 
that she had been smoking methamphetamine with 
him that day. She also stated that Close was living 
with Melissa Seamster and John Walker in the 
basement apartment of a house located at 479 South 
Copyright © West Publishing Co. 1996 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works. 
904 P.2d 209, State v. Covington, (Utah App. 1995) 
Page 2 
100 East. 
The officers were familiar with Mr. Close, who 
had a history of involvement with controlled 
substances. Prior to Anderson's arrest, the officers 
had received tips that Close had been selling 
methamphetamine and had searched Close's vehicle 
and found drug paraphernalia. Moreover, the 
officers were familiar with the house Anderson 
described, having arrested people residing in it. 
Based upon this information, the officers obtained 
a search warrant. The warrant authorized them to 
search "[t]he downstairs apartment and the person of 
all individuals present at 479 South 100 East, 
Pleasant Grove" for "narcotics and other evidence of 
trafficking!,] including but not limited to cash, 
weapons, baggies, scales, buy-owe sheets and 
paraphernalia for the use, storage, sale or 
preparation of narcotics." 
The officers arrived at Close's apartment to 
execute the warrant at 8:40 p.m. on February 22, 
1994. The door leading to the apartment was 
located on the north side of a covered porch that 
protruded from the southeast corner of the rear of 
the house. A truck with its hood up was parked to 
the north of Close's door, approximately eight to ten 
feet away. Defendant stood between the truck and 
the door. The first officers to arrive at the door 
encountered defendant. One of them took custody 
of him, while the others proceeded into the 
apartment. 
The officer who took custody of defendant 
ordered him to lie down on the ground, with his 
hands and legs spread. The officer then frisked 
defendant, and felt a hard, cylindrical object in his 
shirt pocket, as well as what he believed to be a 
cigarette package. The officer testified that the hard 
object "was small, like a pinky size, cylindrical in 
nature and had the curvature around the mouth piece 
and things of that nature that I felt indicated to me-
or made me feel it was a marijuana pipe." 
The officer did not immediately remove either 
object from defendant's shirt, but instead waited 
until the apartment had been secured. He then took 
defendant inside the apartment and stood him next to 
the other suspects. At that point, the officer 
searched defendant's person and removed a 
marijuana pipe and cigarette package from 
defendant's shirt pocket. Upon inspecting the 
cigarette package, which contained marijuana, the 
officer arrested defendant for possession of drug 
paraphernalia and possession of marijuana. At the 
Pleasant Grove Police Department, officers 
conducted an extensive search of defendant and 
found a small quantity of methamphetamine in the 
change pocket of his jeans. A larger quantity was 
also found near the truck where defendant had first 
been observed. 
Defendant was charged with possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) in a drug-
free zone, a second-degree felony, Utah Code Ann. 
Sec. 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1994); possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana) in a drug-free zone, 
a class A misdemeanor,_ii. Sec. 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); 
noncompliance with the illegal drug stamp tax act, a 
third-degree felony,J$L Sec. 59-19-103(1)Q>)\ and 
possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free 
zone, a class A misdemeanor, j$L Sec. 58-37a-5(l). 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the 
drugs and marijuana pipe. After an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court denied the motion. 
Defendant then pled guilty to the first two charges, 
conditioned upon his right to appeal the trial court's 
denial of his motion to suppress._Sfi£ State v. Sery, 
758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1988). Defendant 
now challenges the trial court's ruling as violative of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
•211 
"ALL PERSONS PRESENT" SEARCH 
WARRANT 
[1][2] The Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution directs that "no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause ... and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized." U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
As a general rule, therefore, " 'open-ended' or 
'general' warrants are constitutionally prohibited." 
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92 n. 4, 100 S.Ct. 
338, 342 n. 4, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979). 
Additionally, it is clear that a warrant to search 
designated premises does not authorize the search of 
every individual who happens to be on the premises. 
Id. "Because the standard of probable cause must be 
particularized to every person or place to be 
searched, a warrant authorizing the search of 
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premises does not authorize officers to search an 
individual merely because that person is present on 
the premises." State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 
(Utah App. 1988), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 
1989). 
The question remains whether a warrant that 
authorizes the search of unnamed persons present at 
a location is lawful if it is supported by probable 
cause to believe that all persons in the place at the 
time of the search will be involved in the criminal 
activity upon which the warrant issued. This issue 
is one of first impression in Utah. 
The majority of courts that have addressed the 
validity of "all persons present" search warrants 
have held that, depending on the evidence supporting 
the probable cause for their issuance, they may pass 
constitutional muster. (FN1) In State v. De Simone, 
60 N.J. 319, 288 A.2d 849 (1972), the New Jersey 
Supreme Court set forth the following rationale for 
upholding such a warrant: 
On principle, the sufficiency of a warrant to 
search persons identified only by their presence at 
a specified place should depend upon the facts. A 
showing that lottery slips are sold in a department 
store or an industrial plant obviously would not 
justify a warrant to search every person on the 
premises, for there would be no probable cause to 
believe that everyone there was participating in 
the illegal operation. On the other hand, a 
showing that a dice game is operated in a manhole 
or in a barn should suffice, for the reason that the 
place is so limited and the illegal operation so 
overt that it is likely that everyone present is a 
party to the offense. Such a setting furnishes not 
only probable cause but also a designation of the 
persons to be searched which functionally is as 
precise as a dimensional portrait of them. 
... [W]ith regard to the Fourth Amendment 
demand for specificity as to the subject to be 
searched, there is none of the vice of a general 
warrant if the individual is thus identified by 
physical nexus to the ongoing criminal event 
itself. In such a setting, the officer executing the 
warrant has neither the authority nor the 
opportunity to search everywhere for anyone 
violating a law. So long as there is good reason 
to suspect or believe that anyone present at the 
anticipated scene will probably be a participant, 
presence becomes the descriptive fact satisfying 
the aim of the Fourth Amendment. 
Id.,288A.2dat850. 
In Commonwealth v. Smith, 370 Mass. 335, 348 
N.E.2d 101. cert, denied. 429 U.S. *212 944,97 
S.Ct. 364, 50 L.Ed.2d 314 (1976), the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court applied similar 
reasoning to uphold a warrant commanding the 
police to search an apartment and the person of one 
Jane Doe and any person present. Id., 348 N.E.2d 
at 102. The court emphasized that an affidavit in 
support of a warrant seeking to authorize a search of 
any person present must be strictly scrutinized. The 
court elucidated three factors it deemed of particular 
relevance in reviewing the affidavits: 
[1] the premises or area to be searched are small, 
confined and private [as opposed to a public or 
quasi-public place where casual presence of 
persons for myriad of noncriminal reasons is to be 
expected]; [2] the nature of the criminal activity 
is such that the participants (in general) constantly 
shift or change so that it is, practically, impossible 
for the police to predict that any specific person 
or persons will be on the premises at any given 
time; and [3] the items specifically described in 
the warrant as the target of the search are of a 
size or kind which renders them easily and likely 
to be concealed on the person. 
Id., 348 N.E.2d at 107 (footnote omitted). 
The court in Smith concluded that the affidavit 
supporting the search warrant at issue in that case 
provided "probable cause to believe that any person 
present on the premises described in the search 
warrant was involved in illegal trafficking in 
heroin." Id. at 103. The affidavit relied upon 
information received from an informant who had 
been inside the apartment named in the warrant and 
had seen, on two occasions, the person named in the 
warrant selling heroin to other persons present in the 
apartment. Id. at 106. The affidavit also indicated 
that police surveillance of the apartment had 
revealed persons known to traffic in heroin enter and 
leave the apartment. Id. 
Several subsequent drug trafficking cases have 
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upheld search warrants upon facts establishing a 
sufficient nexus between the criminal activity, the 
place of the activity, and the persons at the place. 
In Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 369 Pa.Super. 
398, 535 A.2d 611 (1987), the court upheld a search 
warrant authorizing the search of all persons present 
at a home in which a confidential and reliable 
informant had, immediately preceding the issuance 
of the warrant, observed the owner selling cocaine 
to other persons at the house. The informant had 
also observed large quantities of cocaine in the 
house available for sale. Additional informants also 
corroborated that drugs were being sold from the 
house. Id.,535 A.2dat615. 
In State ex rel. L.Q., 236 N.J.Super. 464, 566 
A.2d 223 (19891. cert, denied. 122 N.J. 121, 584 
A.2d 199 (1990), the court upheld an all persons 
present warrant supported by the report of a reliable 
source that ongoing cocaine sales were taking place 
at the specified location; police surveillance that 
revealed numerous persons entering the premises, 
staying for short periods of time, and then leaving 
the house; and the observation of a lookout person 
to warn the occupants of police activity in the 
neighborhood. Id., 566 A.2d at 226. 
Finally, in People v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 1156 
(Colo.Ct.App. 1990), the court upheld an all persons 
present warrant obtained on the strength of tips from 
at least nine confidential sources that crack cocaine 
was being sold from the residence; police 
surveillance and observation of extensive walk-in 
and drive-in traffic at the location; and several 
undercover purchases of crack cocaine from the 
residence. Id. at 1158, 1161: accord State v. 
Hinkel, 365 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Minn. 1985); 
Morton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 946, 434 
S.E.2d 890, 892-93 (1993). 
[3] In the present case, the officers' authority to 
search defendant arose out of the search warrant's 
direction to search N[t]he downstairs apartment and 
the person of all individuals present at 479 South 
100 East." In light of the foregoing, the precise 
issue before us is whether, based on the affidavit 
upon which the search warrant issued, the 
authorities had probable cause to believe that any 
person found at the basement apartment would be 
involved in narcotics trafficking. (FN2) 
The affidavit upon which the search warrant 
issued provides, in relevant part: 
•213. 4. After her arrest I interviewed Anderson 
further. She stated that she had stolen the drugs 
several hours before ... from Rick Close's tool box 
and that he had additional quantities of 
methamphetamine in bindles, ready for sale.... She 
stated that Close lives in a house at 479 South 100 
East in die basement apartment which is entered in 
the rear. She stated that Close has been supplying 
her with amphetamine and that she has been 
smoking meth with Close today. Anderson stated 
that Close was living with Melissa Seamster and 
John Walker. 
6. Anderson has a substantial criminal history 
including longtime involvement with controlled 
substances. Her history includes possession of 
amphetamines, prescription fraud, and uttering 
forged prescriptions. NET officers have 
purchased drugs from Anderson and have arrested 
Anderson in possession of controlled substances 
on other occasions. 
7. Officers have verified from personal 
observation that Rick Close resides at 479 South 
100 East, Pleasant Grove. The building is a white 
frame building containing two apartments. One is 
on the main or ground level and the other is a 
basement apartment entered from the rear on the 
east side. 
8. Rick Close has a substantial history of 
involvement with controlled substances. Officers 
have received tips from at least three separate 
sources that Close has been selling 
methamphetamine within the past three weeks. 
Officers recently searched the vehicle of Close 
and found drug paraphernalia. There are 
presently two active warrants for the arrest of 
Rick Close from the Orem Department of the 
Fourth Circuit Court with bail in the amount of 
$470 and the Justice Court for Pleasant Grove 
City with bail in the amount of $2,000, cash only. 
12. NET officers have been receiving tips 
Copyright © West Publishing Co. 1996 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works. 
904 P.2d 209, State v. Covington, (Utah App. 1995) 
Page 5 
regarding this residence from numerous sources 
during the past year. The information consistently 
indicates that controlled substances are being sold 
from that location. Officers have conducted 
surveillance at various times during the past six 
months and have arrested people residing in the 
building and found drug paraphernalia and 
controlled substances including methamphetamine. 
Officers observed a purchase of narcotics from 
the house by Darcy McDonald on 6-30-93. 
McDonald was subsequently arrested and charged 
with a narcotics related offense. 
13. It is my experience that persons who deal 
in small bindles of methamphetamine will have, in 
their possession or at their residence, narcotics 
and other evidence of trafficking including but not 
limited to cash, weapons, baggies, scales, buy-
owe sheets and paraphernalia for the use, storage, 
sale or preparation of narcotics. Such persons 
will typically sell what they have as quickly as 
they can until they are out of inventory at which 
time they will attempt to "re-up" or purchase a 
large quantity to be divided into smaller bindles 
for sale. 
15. It is also my experience that when drugs 
are being used and sold in a residence occupied by 
several adults, all of whom have criminal histories 
and experience with narcotics[,] that all persons 
on the premises will likely have relevant evidence 
on their persons or in their possession. 
Moreover, small bindles of drugs as expected in 
this matter can be readily hidden on a person or 
destroyed once the intent to search is revealed. 
We conclude that the affidavit in this case 
establishes probable cause to search all persons 
present at the basement apartment. We therefore 
affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion 
to suppress and affirm his conviction. 
ORME, P.J., and BENCH, J., concur. 
FNL In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 
338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), the Supreme Court 
addressed the question of whether the police could 
search a person based on his presence at a tavern 
they had a warrant to search. Without considering 
"situations where the warrant itself authorizes the 
search of unnamed persons in a place and is 
supported by probable cause to believe that persons 
who will be in the place at the time of the search 
will be in possession of illegal drugs," id. at 92 n. 
4, 100 S.Ct. at 343 n. 4, the Court concluded that 
probable cause did not exist under the supporting 
affidavit in that case to search all persons present. 
The Court emphasized: 
There is no reason to suppose that, when the 
search warrant was issued on March 1, 1976, the 
authorities had probable cause to believe that any 
person found on the premises of the Aurora Tap 
Tavern, aside from "Greg," would be violating 
the law. The search warrant complaint did not 
allege that the bar was frequented by persons 
illegally purchasing drugs. It did not state that the 
informant had ever seen a patron of the tavern 
purchase drugs from "Greg" or from any other 
person. Nowhere, in fact, did the complaint even 
mention the patrons of the Aurora Tap Tavern. 
Id. at 90, 100 S.Ct. at 341-42 (footnote omitted). 
FN2. In its ruling on defendant's motion to suppress, 
the trial court found that defendant was " 'present' 
at the apartment." Because defendant has not 
properly challenged that finding on appeal, we 
accept as fact that defendant was present at the 
basement apartment for purposes of our analysis. 
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KAY BRYSON 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
100 EAST CENTER, SUITE 2100 
PROVO, UTAH 84601 
PHONE: (801) 370-8026 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : SEARCH WARRANT 
STEVEN HUNDLEY : Criminal No. 
ANGELA HUNDLEY 
255 N. 1600 W. #121 
PROVO, UT 
Defendants 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Magistrate's It has been established by oath or 
^Indorsement affirmation made or submitted to me this 
i day of November, 1994 that there is 
4*> 
probable cause to believe the following: 
The property described below: 
was unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed; 
has been used or is possessed for the purpose of 
being used to commit or conceal the commission of 
an offense; or 
is evidence of illegal conduct. 
The property described below is most probably 
located at the premises also set forth below. 
The person or entity in possession of the property 
is a party to the alleged illegal conduct. 
That this warrant may be served without notice of 
intent or authority to search, due to the fact that 
the property to be searched for may be -easily 
secreted, disposed of, or destroyed if notice of 
intent to search is oiven. 
5- That this warrant may be served in the day time 
hours. 
NOW, THEREFORE, YOU AND EACH OF YOU, are hereby directed to conduct 
a search of the a residence described as a single-wide mobile home 
located at 255 N. 1600 W. , Provo, Utah. The mobile home is in the 
south end of the mobile park located on a corner, that corner being 
a south west corner. The mobile home is cream colored with brown 
trim with the main entrance facing south. The numerals n121" are 
located on the east side and the south side of the mobile home. 
Your are also hereby directed to search of any outbuildings, 
curtilage, vehicles, and the person of any individuals present at 
the time of the execution of this warrant. 
You are directed to search for the presence of the following 
property: controlled substances, together with associated 
paraphernalia, including items used or capable of being used for 
the storage, use, production, or distribution of marijuana and 
methamphetamine. 
IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring 
the property forthwith before me at the above court or to hold the 
same in your possession pending further order of this court. You 
are instructed to leave a receipt for the property with the person 
in whose possession the property is found or at the premises where 
the property was located. After execution of the warrant you shall 
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to me together with 
a written inventory of any property seized identifying the place 
where the property is being held. 
THIS WARRANT MUST BE SERVED WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS FROM THE DATE 
OF ISSUANCE. 
DATED this ) day of November, 1994, £_^fjZ, ^ M. 
MAGISTRATE 
& 
KAY BRYSON 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
100 E. CENTER, SUITE 2100 
PROVO, UTAH 
PHONE: ( 8 0 1 ) 3 7 0 - 8 0 2 6 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
P l a i n t i f f , 
- v s -
r>* 
^CfiSSNjniKnT.KY 
ANGELA HUNDLEY 
2*55 H. lSUtr-Wv-#121 
PROVO, UT 
Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
A SEARCH WARRANT 
Criminal No. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
:ss. 
) 
Comes now Jerry Harper, having been duly sworn, who deposes 
and states as follows: 
j . I am a sergeant with the Provo Police Department. I have 
been a peace officer since 1979 when I graduated from POST as the 
officer with the highest academic achievement in my class. During 
the time I have been a peace officer I have received over 225 hours 
of specialized training for law enforcement work including 185 
hours of training specific to narcotics work. Narcotics classes I 
have taken include training in surveillance, operation of 
surveillance and electronic investigatory equipment, field testing 
of drugs and drug recognition. As an officer I have participated 
in hundreds of operations involving the undercover purchase of 
narcotics and/or the arrest of person for substance abuse related 
violations. I have experience working undercover providing first 
hand experience with narcotics trafficking. I have supervised 
narcotics investigations for the Provo Police Department since 
1992. I am currently designated as the department 
trainer/specialist in the areas of fingerprinting, surveillance, 
video equipment, narcotics and drug recognition. 
2. On Sept. 21, 1994 Lt. Dave Bolda of the Provo City Police 
Department received an anonymous phone call that Defendants are 
using and selling cocaine. The caller indicated Defendants' 
address as being 255 N. 1600 W. #121, Provo, Utah, Utah County. 
The anonymous caller also indicated that Defendant Steven Hundley 
is dealing heavily at his place of employment, that being Mountain 
States Steel. 
3. That during the month of October, 1994 Officer Jensen of 
the Provo City Police Department received information from a 
Confidential Informant that Defendant Steven Hundley is selling 
cocaine. 
4. Your affiant believes the Confidential Informant who 
spoke to Officer Jensen to be reliable in that the Confidential 
Informant has supplied law enforcement with information in the past 
that has proven reliable. 
5. Provo City has a solid waste collection system. Each 
home is assigned a specific can which is owned by the City. An 
additional can may be obtained for an additional fee. Once per 
week, the cans are to be placed at curbside or in the street for 
collection. A City truck then mechanically picks up and empties 
the can. 
6. That on Nov. 7, 1994 in the early morning hours, your 
affiant and other officers responded to the residence located at 
255 N. 1600 W. #121 in Provo. There was one can placed in the 
street for collection at that location with the numeral M121n 
stencilled on the side. Your affiant took the can to the Provo 
Police Department where the contents were reviewed. After your 
affiant finished, the remaining contents were placed in the can and 
the can returned to the street in front of the residence at 2 55 N. 
1600 W. #121. 
7. Within the can, officers found paraphernalia associated 
with the ingestion of methamphetamine. A chemical reagent test was 
used on a piece of paraphernalia, that being a piece of charred 
glass, which showed positive for methamphetamine. Also found in 
the garbage were marijuana stems and leaf fragments. A chemical 
reagent test was used on a leaf fragment which showed positive for 
marijuana. Other parts of paraphernalia found were syringes, 
baggies, and butane fuel canisters. Also found in the garbage was 
correspondence listing the address 255 N. 1600 W. #121 and also 
listing the names Steven Hundley and Angie Hundley. 
8. The amounts of residue and marijuana in the garbage 
imply small amounts for use. Such amounts of marijuana and 
methamphetamine are typically packaged in baggies of 1/8 oz. or 
less for marijuana, and one gram bindles for methamphetamine, quite 
small in volume. Such baggies and bindles can quickly and easily 
be hidden in the clothing or be destroyed if intent is given to 
search. Moreover, it is your affiant's experience that persons 
with a potentially violent disposition may react with violence if 
confronted with a search. One of the side effects of 
methamphetamine use is an increase in violent behavior. Entry 
without notice allows officers to secure the residence and secure 
officer safety. 
9. Marijuana, methamphetamine, and paraphernalia are often 
kept in outlying vehicles and buildings. Failure to search the 
curtilage of the residence, together with the person of individuals 
present, and vehicles located on the curtilage at the time of the 
execution of the search, will likely result in officers missing 
important evidence. 
10. It is your affiant's experience that most of the people 
I have encountered with the unlawful use of 
marijuana/methamphetamine also .occasionally sell, sometimes paying 
for their use with profits from sales. It is so common as to be 
the rule rather than the exception, to find evidence related to 
production and/or distribution when controlled substances are 
located in a residence. 
11. The residence is more particularly described as a single-
wide mobile home located at 255 N. 1600 W. . Provo, Utah. The 
mobile home is in the south end of the mobile park located ;;n a 
corner, that corner being a south west corner. The mobile home is 
cream colored with brown trim with the main entrance facing south. 
The numerals ,f121n are located on the east side and the south side 
of the mobile home. 
12. Your affiant expects to locate additional controlled 
substances in the residence, together with associated 
parapherndlia, including items used or capable of being used for 
the storage, u«=e, production, or distribution of marijuana a^d 
methamphetamine. 
Wherefore, your affiant requests that a warrant be issued by 
this court authorizing the search of the mobile home, together with 
the curtilage and the person of all individuals present within the 
home and curtilage, and all vehicles located at said residence at 
the time of search for presence of controlled substances together 
with associated paraphernalia including items used or capable of 
being used for the storage, use, production or distribution of 
controlled substances to be executed without notice of intent or 
authority in the daytime. 
Dated this 
q& 
day of Ooteobcr- 1994 f\. M. 
4£s04J 
per 
ial Investigations 
Subscribed and sworn before me on the _ 
him^^vJI^-^ 1994; ?••?*' 
^ ? v ^ 
/r 
.M. 
day of 
MAGISTRATE 
£!tf'£ 
